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ABSTRACT: Critical infrastructures, e.g. electricity transmission / distribution, public transport and health care systems, need to 
be protected against various internal and external risks which can be safety- and / or security-relevant. Predominately probability-
based methods are hitherto used for analysing the whole spectrum of risks. We think this is an insufficient approach, presumably 
leading to inefficient resource allocation and biased risk perception, as it does not consider the different natures of risk. This 
paper looks at the key difference between safety- and security-relevant risks, highlights resulting implications for critical 
infrastructure protection and describes a possible approach for handling these different types of risk. 
Keywords: critical infrastructure protection, safety-relevant risks, security-relevant risks. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Systems and their related assets and facilities are referred to as critical infrastructure if they are essential for social and economic 
welfare (e.g., Cohen 2010, Schätter et al. 2014). They are the backbone of a nation‟s health and security (DHS 2012). Critical 
infrastructures are increasingly connected, interdependent and complex, usually spatially far off and, thus, hard to protect. They 
are continuously exposed to myriad internal and external risks of different nature. This implies that it is important to use 
appropriate risk analysis methods to achieve sufficient levels of safety and security. 
Risks can be categorised manifoldly. One important distinguishing feature of risks is their nature respectively source of origin. A 
distinction can be made between two types of risk (Bieta et al. 2009). On the one hand risks can be unintentionally caused by 
random or natural events (hereafter referred to as „type 1 risks‟). Type 1 risks can be adequately analysed using statistical 
distributions and simulations. Risks may, however, also be deliberately caused by malicious human behaviour (hereafter referred 
to as „type 2 risks‟). Unlike type 1 risks which are caused by randomness, type 2 risks cannot be analysed solely relying on 
statistical measures. They additionally require the consideration of interactive, rational decision-making processes between the 
involved persons or groups, as well as their “intentions, motivations, preferences and capabilities” (Ayyub et al. 2007). However, 
very often exclusively probability-based risk analysis methods are applied to both types of risk. In consequence, this inevitably 
misleads risk perception, causes misjudgement and wastes scarce resources when dealing with type 2 risks (Hall 2009, Brown 
and Cox 2011).  
For improving critical infrastructure protection, we propose to apply different risk analysis approaches to meet the challenges 
associated with the different natures of risk. Furthermore, we recommend combining these different approaches where necessary 
and suitable, considering the individual characteristics of the types of risk at hand. The remainder of our paper is structured as 
follows. In section 2 we point out important differences between safety- and security-relevant risks. Subsequent to highlighting 
implications for critical infrastructure protection in section 3, we describe in section 4 how to approach the risk analysis process 
when confronted with different types of risk. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the issues raised.  
2 SAFETY- AND SECURITY-RELEVANT RISKS 
Critical infrastructures are exposed to miscellaneous natural and man-made threats (hazards). Like all man-made systems, critical 
infrastructures are, to some extent, shielded from the surrounding environment. This shielding aims both at protecting the system 
against negative impacts from the surrounding environment and vice versa. These threats cause, with a (un-)known probability, 
damage or other adverse effects to the system or the surrounding environment, constituting safety- and security relevant risks for 
critical infrastructures (Aven and Renn 2010). The main difference between safety- and security relevant risks is their source of 
origin ( i tre- am a  d s and  ouissou 2 1 ).  
Within the context of critical infrastructure protection, the concept of safety aims at preventing, detecting, and reacting to events 
which accidently harm people, property or the environment, endangered through the critical infrastructure (Firesmith 2003). In 
other words, the concept of safety primarily deals with randomness, whether it is caused by nature (e.g., natural occurring events 
such as fires, floods, storms, earthquakes), human behaviour (e.g., unintentional mistakes, ignorance) and / or other errors (e.g., 
excessive burden, material defects). Safety, realized through appropriate system design and safety barriers (e.g., physical barriers, 
digital barriers), aims at protecting the environment from hazards resulting from the existence and / or operation of man-made 










unintentionally caused by random (or natural) events. In comparison, the concept of security deals with preventing, detecting, and 
reacting to events which maliciously harm people, property (assets and facilities, but also data) or the environment, endangered 
through the critical infrastructure (Firesmith 2003). Unlike the concept of safety, the concept of security deals with events which 
are caused by intentional malicious human behaviour or, in other words, with attacks rather than accidental events (e.g., arson, 
fraud, crime, terrorism). Security, realized as well through appropriate system design and security barriers (e.g., physical barriers, 
digital barriers), aims at protecting man-made systems against internal and external attacks (Burns et al. 1992, Firesmith 2003). 
Thus, security-relevant risks are mainly type 2 risks (cf. section 2) which are caused by deliberate malicious human behaviour 
(e g    i tre- am a  d s and  ouissou 2 1    aspotnig and  pdahl 2 13  eng et al. 2014). 
The degree of risk is determined through the degree of uncertainty associated with the risk. Uncertainty, in the sense of being 
uncertain about the outcome of or having incomplete knowledge in a decision-situation, can be classified into two categories – 
aleatoric (inherent, stochastic) and epistemic (subjective, systemic) uncertainty (e.g., Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009, Senge et al. 
2014). Aleatoric uncertainty is caused by inherent randomness (parameter variability), whereas epistemic uncertainty is caused 
by a lack of knowledge or ignorance of the decision-maker (e.g., Hora 1996, Paté-Cornell 1996, Helton et al. 2010, Ayyub 2014). 
Aleatoric uncertainty is not necessarily based on a lack of knowledge and, thus, cannot be fully eliminated. In contrast, epistemic 
uncertainty can be eliminated over time if the decision-maker gets more information (Ayyub 2014). With regard to safety- and 
security-relevant risks, safety-relevant risks are dominated by aleatoric uncertainties (with randomness as the decisive feature), 
whereas security-relevant risks are dominated by epistemic uncertainties and uncertainties caused through strategic interactions 
(with deliberate choice as the decisive feature) (Bieta et al. 2009).  
Both the concept of safety and security have many commonalities and are frequently difficult to distinguish (e.g., fraudster who 
want to enrich themselves or arsonists are by definition a security risk (as they intentionally harm the system), but also pose a 
safety risk when their actions affect others too), and they sometimes cause each other. To protect a threatened critical 
infrastructure against safety- and security-relevant risks, it is necessary to take into consideration the different natures of these 
risks and their initiating hazardous events. It is also important for decision-makers to use appropriate, effective and versatile risk 
analysis approaches which take into consideration the crucial differences between these different concepts.  
3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
Risk management for critical infrastructure protection is affected by and depends on organisational achievable, technical feasible, 
economic reasonable and legally allowed safety and security measures. Also, the wishes and demands of different stakeholders 
(e.g., infrastructure owners and operators, government, customers, the public) need to be taken into consideration.  
Different stakeholders are affected by different types of risk and have a different risk perception. Thus, it is necessary to consider 
all stakeholders who can possibly influence infrastructure protection and operation. That means many heterogeneous risks need 
to be considered and analysed. As already mentioned in section 2, safety- and security-relevant risks should be seen as different 
concepts with unequal properties. This implies that different risk analysis approaches are required to sufficiently analyse all 
identified risks. However, in practice, critical infrastructure operators usually apply just „standard‟ risk analysis approaches to the 
whole spectrum of risks. 
 y „„standard‟ risk analysis approaches‟ we mean generally known, well-established empirical and / or statistical risk analysis 
approaches, such as variance analysis, probability risk analysis, scenario analysis or Bayesian analysis (e.g., Schoemaker 1995, 
Wright and Goodwin 1999, Min et al. 2007, Dillon et al. 2009). These approaches, when used as stand-alone risk analysis 
approach, are suitable for analysing naturally or randomly occurring events or, in other words, when dealing with safety-relevant 
risks of type 1. By comparison, when analysing safety- or security-relevant risks of type 2, decision-makers additionally need to 
consider the strategic interactions between themselves and the intelligent adverse human counterpart. Thus, as information about 
the preferences and capabilities of the adversary are usually barely known, it is often not possible to reliably conclude from past 
events to future events  solely relying on „standard‟ risk analysis approa hes.  
For analysing security-relevant threats and hazards, we suggest applying other, more appropriate risk analysis approaches than 
the widely used „standard‟ risk analysis approa hes  In parti ular  we propose using game theoreti  approa hes as they expli itly 
consider the strategic interactions between two or more humans. Game theoretic reasoning improves safety- and security-relevant 
decision-making (when confronted with type 2 risks) in several ways, forcing decision-makers to get a realistic idea of risk 
reduction limitations, to think about the attackers preferences, capabilities and their possible attack-strategies and, thus, to 
develop „ ustomised‟ defen e strategies (considering the strategies which they cannot choose) (Wiens et al. 2014). However, 
experiences and knowledge gained in the past (e.g., related empirical and statistical data) are important sources of information for 
game theoretic reasoning.  
We are convinced that it is important for critical infrastructure protection to clearly differentiate between different types of risk 










4 APPROACH TO HANDLE DIFFERENT TYPES OF RISK 
As previously mentioned, safety- and security-relevant risks are often analysed using the same analysis methods (see Table 1). In 
practice, decision-makers rarely differentiate between the different natures of risk, although this distinction is necessary to apply 
appropriate analysis methods to different risks.  
Table 1: Risk analysis process without differentiation between different natures of risk (own table) 
risk analysis process 
risk identification e.g., fires, floods, storms, earthquakes, unintentional mistakes, ignorance, material defects, fraud, terrorism 
risk categorization 
safety- and security-relevant risks 
type 1 risks and type 2 risks 
(fires, floods, storms, earthquakes, unintentional mistakes, ignorance, material defects, fraud, terrorism) 
analysis methods 
selection 
empirical / statistical methods  
(e.g., variance analysis, probability risk analysis, scenario analysis, Bayesian analysis) 
We propose a clear distinction between risks of different nature before analysing them (see Table 2). In the first step, all relevant 
risks need to be identified (risk identification) and available information / knowledge on it from all accessible sources need to be 
gathered. In the second step, the identified risks need to be categorised as safety- or security relevant (risk categorization), and 
whether they are type 1 or 2 risks. Next, the applicability of the risk analysis approaches, known and available to the decision-
maker, has to be determined (approach applicability determination) and possible weak points of them, which otherwise would 
bias risk perception, need to be identified (approach weak point identification). Then, if necessary, supplementary methods and 
approaches need to be found to extend the respective risk analysis models (approach improvement). These last three steps can be 
summed up as analysis method(s) selection process.   
Table 2: Risk analysis process with differentiation between different natures of risk (own table) 
risk analysis process 
risk identification e.g., fire, floods, storms, earthquakes, unintentional mistakes, ignorance, material defects, fraud, terrorism 
risk categorization 
safety-relevant risks security-relevant risks 
type 1 risks 
(fire, floods, storms, earthquakes, 
unintentional mistakes, ignorance, 
material defects) 
type 2 risks 
 (under certain circumstances 
fire (arson), fraud, terrorism) 
type 2 risks 
(fire (arson), fraud, terrorism)  
analysis method(s) 
selection 
empirical / statistical methods  
(e.g., variance analysis, probability 
risk analysis, scenario analysis, 
Bayesian analysis) 
game theory and / or other strategic 
decision-analysis methods 
(supplemented by empirical / 
statistical methods) 
game theory and / or other strategic 
decision-analysis methods 
(supplemented by empirical / 
statistical methods) 
Last but not least, the results of the analysis with and without risk differentiation should be compared (approach review). This 
step is important to gain further insights into the decision-problem to be solved because decision-makers are often confronted 
with an information overflow and, thus, have problems to identify the key information relevant for solving the decision-problem. 
No single risk analysis approach will ever provide an optimal solution for critical infrastructure protection. The determination of 
risk is always subjective and, thus, the whole process of risk analysis (as part of a risk management process) only supports the 
decision-making process, but does not substitute it.  
5 ADDED VALUE FOR THE POST 2015 FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
Our work deals with critical infrastructure protection against natural and man-made hazards and, thus, supports disaster risk 
reduction. In future, disasters, whether of natural origin (e.g., fire, floods, storms, earthquakes) or man-made (e.g., fire, oil spills, 
terrorism, transport accidents), will have severe consequences because of the increasing connectivity, interdependency and 
complexity of critical infrastructures world-wide. Our work points out a crucial aspect of risk analysis which always needs to be 
considered – the different natures of risk. Therefore, research in future should focus more on the development of tailored risk 
analysis and risk management approaches to meet the challenges associated with the different natures of risk. In this context, 
research also should pay more attention to the increasing complexity of the decision-making processes themselves.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
There is a need for rethinking the way how safety- and security-relevant risks are analysed. Risk managers and risk management 
systems often do not explicitly distinguish between them. This supports and amplifies misallocation of resources and sometimes 
even increases the risks. It is important to pay more attention to choosing the right risk analysis approach(es) for a certain risk, 










necessary that critical infrastructure owners and operators apply other, more suitable risk analysis approaches to protect their 
systems against emerging threats. Both safety- and security-relevant risks have common features and are sometimes inseparable, 
implicating that risk analysis research should focus more on integrating different risk analysis approaches to achieve holistic 
analysis approaches for systems threatened by safety- and security-relevant hazards. 
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